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Abstract. This paper aims at investigating the notion of οἰκεῖον (one’s own) in 
Plato’s Republic, by assessing what it specifically adds to the Platonic account of justice. 
Although the investigation is mostly devoted to analyzing the relevant passages of Book 
IV where the definition of justice as oikeiopragia is elaborated, it starts with the first 
occurrences of the term οἰκεῖον in the former books of the Republic, showing how the 
notion is introduced to counter Trasymachus’ challenge and then philosophically re-
fined in order to make sense of the Platonic claim that justice does not harm but rather 
favors one’s own good. 
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According to Aristoxenus of Tarentum, who heard this anecdote from Aristotle him-
self, Plato’s lecture on the Good caused surprise, incomprehension, even indignation 
among the audience1. Instead of the expected discussion about the traditional human 
goods like wealth, health, strength, etc., they were treated to a lecture on mathematical 
notions ending with the seemingly far-fetched conclusion that the Good is the One. 
This anecdote, whether true or false, would hardly surprise Plato’s readers who might 
now and then experience the same perplexity as his audience did centuries ago. They 
may be puzzled by some of the views endorsed by his main character and spokesman 
Socrates, who is never afraid of challenging common sense. Many of these unexpected 
views can be found in the Republic, and among them is the account of justice. Alt-
hough it may be less spectacular than the above proposition, the description of justice 
as the state in which a city or a soul is doing one’s own is a feature difficult to under-
stand and to accommodate with everyday intuition. 
                                                          
1 See Aristoxenus, Elementa Harmonica II 20, 16 ff., in ROSS 1955, p. 111. 
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The puzzling description of the just person as «doing his own» seems to baffle 
Socrates’ interlocutors as well as Plato’s commentators. This is not only true for mod-
ern readers2, but also for antiquity. Indeed, Aristotle’s reaction does not fail to coun-
teract Plato’s account by going back to the characterization of justice as ἀλλότριον 
ἀγαθὸν on the grounds that justice is πρὸς ἕτερον (Nicomachean Ethics, V 1, 
1130a3-4).  Although he grants Plato that justice is the complete excellence, he is care-
ful to add the crucial qualification, holding for general as well as particular justice3, 
that justice is concerned with others, advocating thereby a view presumably more akin 
to everyday intuition. The most obvious feature of justice, namely that it concerns 
and regulates our interactions with other persons, seems to vanish in the Platonic for-
mula, or at least to be implied only in a negative or privative way, that of not en-
croaching upon their goods or rights. Plato’s deflationist account might then appear 
to be disappointingly far below common expectations about the meaning of justice. 
Even Cephalus’ or Polemarchus’ suggestions seem to say more about the interpersonal 
dimension of justice: their respective accounts, «to speak the truth and repay what one 
has borrowed» (331d2) and «to give to each what is owed to him» (331e4) then 
amended into «treating friends well and enemies badly» (332d6) do involve the rela-
tionship to another4. The somehow paradoxical gesture of turning to one’s own in 
order to account for justice, the relational virtue par excellence, then, calls and de-
serves attention. In this paper I would like to indirectly investigate this account of 
justice by calling attention to the contribution to it of the οἰκεῖον, usually translated 
as «one’s own». Indeed, my assumption is that this notion, though apparently loose 
and trivial and often taken as a synonym for the possessive, should not be overlooked5. 
It enters not only into the characterization of justice as οἰκειοπραγία but it also plays 
a significant part in the whole frame of the Republic. 
This notion, first, is meant to respond to the polemical challenge of Thrasymachus, 
soon taken over by Plato’s two brothers. Despite some nuances, the bulk of the 
discourse remains basically the same: justice is not worth choosing for its own sake, 
rather something that everyone who can afford it would and should dispense with. 
Either taken as the lesser evil necessary for anyone engaged in social life or indicted as 
                                                          
2 Some of them pinpoint a gap, not to say a flaw, in the articulation between the social and 
psychological accounts of justice (see VLASTOS 1968). Some confess - or intend to defend Plato’s theory 
against - a difficulty in relating this conception of justice to the commonly held view according to which 
justice is concerned with the good of others and so demands to set aside one’s own interest for the sake of 
theirs (see WATERLOW 1972). 
3 See NE V 2, 1130b1, V 6, 1134b5. 
4 Here and after, I cite Reeve’s translation of the Republic (Reeve 2004), occasionally slightly 
modified. 
5 Few scholars pay attention to the notion. An exception is HELMER 2010, pp. 258-260. 
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the deceptive value thanks to which the stronger take advantage of the people coward 
or credulous enough to comply with it, justice would be deprived of any intrinsic 
value. The continuity between Thrasymachus’ charge and the two brothers’ challenge 
is supported by the quick summary of the case against justice at 392b1-3, which brings 
together the attacks of the former and the suspicions of the latter6: 
 
«They [i.e. poets and prose writers] say that many unjust people are happy and many just 
ones wretched, that doing injustice is profitable if it escapes detection, and that justice is another’s 
good but one’s own loss».  
 
For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on Thrasymachus’ charge precisely 
because he points out a divorce between justice and one’s own (οἰκεῖον) interests or 
goods. When Socrates endeavors to meet his challenge and to rehabilitate justice, his 
use of the term οἰκεῖον aims then at denying such a divorce and at grounding some 
of the major ethical concepts at play in the Republic, namely justice and virtue, into 
the deepest interests of the human being. By doing so, the notion functions as a kind 
of binder between them.  
My main purpose is therefore to identify what the notion of οἰκεῖον specifically 
adds to the Platonic account of justice and thereby to that of the (human) good. This 
investigation will be mostly devoted to analyzing the relevant passages of Book IV 
where the definition of justice is elaborated. This will first require placing the concept 
into a wider context, by pointing out some of its meaningful occurrences in the 
previous books. This review does not pretend to be exhaustive: it will limit itself to 
those passages with a specific and philosophically significant argument and leave aside 
the (many) occurrences of ordinary meaning where οἰκεῖον and its derivatives simply 
refer to relatives7. It intends to highlight this first remarkable feature of the οἰκεῖον, 
namely that the notion marks the long journey of the Republic by occurring at turning 
points and key passages. Its initial mention appears at the very beginning, in Book I 
presenting the twofold challenge about justice: what is justice (a) and is justice more 
beneficial, i.e. does it make one happier, than injustice (b)? Οἰκεῖον resurfaces in the 
middle (Book IV) when the question of the definition is resolved; it makes a final 
appearance in Book X, although the initial concern about the comparative value of a 
just and an unjust life has been ultimately and definitely assuaged. 
Given that the notion occurs in the book at specific and strategic places, I would 
like to review some of the occurrences I take as meaningful in order to bring out how 
                                                          
6 The underlying psychological assumptions are also similar, as pointed out by COOPER 2004, pp. 
248-249. See also Burnyeat’s cases for taking Glaucon and Adimantus as the heirs of their 
«dialectical» father, Thrasymachus (BURNYEAT 2004). 
7 See, e.g., 329b1, d3. 
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the notion works as a thread in the vast frame of the Republic and to relate it to the 
overall challenge of the work. 
My first point (1) consists in recalling and unfolding Thrasymachus’ challenge that 
lays out the main stake of the inquiry. In this challenge the notion of one’s own plays 
a significant role for it is precisely what is being wronged by justice. My second step 
(2) concerns Socrates’ first and tentative reply at the end of Book I that brings in the 
crucial connection between the notions of οἰκεῖον, ἀρετή and ἔργον. This connec-
tion underlies the final account of justice in the city and in the soul, elaborated in Book 
IV - to which my ultimate point (3) is devoted. I will focus on the concept of 
οἰκειοπραγία, which I take to be Socrates’ way to meet as precisely as possible Thra-
symachus’ challenge. This notion is meant to characterize justice and to ground this 
virtue in the interests and the genuine nature of the agent in order to bridge the gap 
opened by Thrasymachus between one’s own and justice.    
 
1. The οἰκεῖον in the debate on justice (Book I) 
The first philosophically significant reference is to be found in Thrasymachus’ 
speech that sets the challenge of the Republic. He breaks into the discussion in order 
to react against the paradoxical Socratic stance resulting from Polemarchus’ 
examination, namely that justice can never harm anyone, even one’s enemies. 
Thrasymachus counteracts this paradox by bringing in another one, which is meant 
to demystify the alleged value of justice. His first claim is that justice is nothing other 
than the advantage of the stronger (338c1). Indeed, he takes justice to be embodied 
into laws that are made up by the rulers and therefore subject to change according to 
the interests of the party in power. Forced to vindicate his dismissal of justice against 
Socrates’ dialectical moves, Thrasymachus introduces then the notion of οἰκεῖον in 
order to elaborate its initial claim. He articulates his case against justice in two related 
points that bring out the problematical - for antagonistic - relationship between justice 
and one’s own. The first point consists in pointing out the negative impact of justice 
on the life of the person practicing it. The second point, following from that and 
spelled out a bit later on (348c5-349a1), is that given the harmful effects of justice on 
one’s life, it ought not to be considered as an excellence (ἀρετή), i.e. something 
valuable for its possessor.  
Thrasymachus’ main point is that justice is some alien good, rather than one’s own. 
As a result, far from promoting one’s interest, the cost of justice is very likely to be 
paid by the self. This contrasts with the view advocated by Socrates during his earlier 
discussion with Polemarchus, according to which justice, being a virtue, can never 
harm anyone (335d11-2). For a virtue, i.e. something good, cannot make worse the 
being to which it applies (335b-e). Thrasymachus supports the very opposite: justice 
does harm, but not the person whom it addresses, the enemy one would like to hurt, 
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according to the commonsense morality advocated by Polemarchus8. Rather, justice 
according to Thrasymachus harms the very person who displays it. The overall 
opposition of οἰκεῖον and ἀλλότριον governs then his speech:  
 
«You do not realize that justice and what is just are really the good of another [ἀλλότριον 
ἀγαθὸν], what is advantageous for the stronger and the ruler, and a harm that is all his own for 
the one who obeys and serves [οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη]9. Injus-
tice is the opposite, it rules those simpleminded - for that is what they really are - and just people, 
and the ones it rules do what is advantageous for the other who is stronger, and they make the 
one they serve happy, but they do not make themselves the least bit happy» (343c3-d1). 
 
Justice, at least when practiced by ordinary people, those who are not in position 
to rule, is not only some quality directed to the good of another, as people usually 
believe; it is also so entirely committed to the good of others that it turns out to be at 
one’s own expense. This point is further illustrated by the various contexts and man-
ners where the just person harms his interest (343d3). 
 
«Finally, when each of them holds political office, a just person - even if he is not penalized 
in any other way - finds that his own affairs [τά γε οἰκεῖα] deteriorate more because he has to 
neglect them, that he gains no advantage from the public purse because of his justice, and that 
he is hated by his relatives [τοῖς οἰκείοις] and acquaintances because he is unwilling to do them 
an unjust favor. The opposite is true of an unjust man in every respect» (343e1-7). 
 
Practicing justice doubly harms the agent’s own interest - what is literally οἰκεῖον 
to him. The first aspect of the incompatibility between justice and one’s own is mate-
rial. Justice causes him to neglect his own business (τά οἰκεῖα). For, when devoting 
himself to the commitments of public office, he cannot help but somewhat abandon 
his own business, since he can neither take care of it full time nor compensate such a 
sacrifice by taking advantage of public funds. Compounding this negative effect is the 
fact that the agent is also losing out in social and moral goods, inasmuch as his friends 
and relatives, literally his οἰκεῖοι, tend to distance themselves when they realize that 
they won’t get anything from him and his public office, as they were expecting to. 
The two occurrences of οἰκεῖον in these lines hint at the original and ordinary mean-
ing of the term: etymologically it refers to the household (οἰκία) involving all those 
                                                          
8  The latter is likewise illustrated by Meno’s first account of virtue at 71e2-5: «it is easy to say that a 
man’s virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in doing so, to benefit his friends and 
harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself» (transl. Grube in COOPER 1997). 
For further evidence in Greek philosophy and literature, see also BLUNDELL 1991, esp. chapter 2, pp. 
26-59. 
9 The phrase οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη that mirrors the ἀλλότριον 
ἀγαθὸν sounds almost like an oxymoron. A similar phrase occurs in Book III, 392b3-4 (ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη 
ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν͵ οἰκεία δὲ ζημία), reporting the same thesis as Thrasymachus’ one. 
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who live in the same house, to whom the subject is linked through blood, moral and 
affective ties. The result of justice is that the just man will lose out on both material 
and moral aspects, on οἰκεῖα and οἰκεῖοι. 
The effect here ascribed to just behavior contrasts with the view previously en-
dorsed by Polemarchus on the behalf of Simonides, both advocating a common mo-
rality that Thrasymachus rejects. Justice was supposed to benefit one’s friends 
(332a10f.). Thrasymachus’ argument intends to prove that the just man will not be 
able to help his friends, contrary to what would be expected of him. Unsurprisingly 
then, he is likely, not to say he deserves, to lose his friends10. The material and moral 
(or affective) loss due to justice seriously impairs his chances to be happy, as pointed 
out at 343c8, insofar as wealth and friends are commonly held to be the best way to 
secure oneself from the reversals of fortune11. Justice is thus an alien good, i.e. it is not 
a good at all for those practicing it. Indeed, it deprives them of every layer of what is 
their own and what they would and should care about: wealth, honors and social 
consideration, and, ultimately, friendship and respect from their relatives, the genuine 
οἰκεῖοι. According to Thrasymachus, justice, though hypocritically praised by a com-
monsense morality, is actually a process of deep alienation. It turns out to be the sign 
of the weakness of simpleminded persons (343c6, 348c12) that enhances their help-
lessness by making them unable to secure any kind of good.  
In a nutshell, the main and most remarkable effect of justice is to separate from his 
own anyone weak enough to practice it. Therefore, it is the contrary of any kind of 
capacity, and the opposite of excellence (ἀρετή) and wisdom (σοφία), as Thra-
symachus will argue at 348e1-3, consistent with his first account of the effects of jus-
tice. This twofold alienation, depriving the just person of the things and the beings 
close to him, contrasts indeed plainly with the effects that are to be expected from 
wisdom (σοφία). Let us turn briefly for example to the account of the wisdom origi-
nating friendship in the Lysis (210a-d). Knowledge is precisely able to make οἰκεῖον 
what is otherwise experienced as alien (210c3): for the wise (σοφός), things become 
his own (210b5-6) insofar as he is the only one able to make the most of them, and 
                                                          
10 A somehow similar process is described in Book VIII with the coming-to-be of the timocratic man, 
whose mother is complaining and blaming his father for not committing himself enough to public life. 
The aristocratic father is sticking to his own business and is then lacking of φιλοπραγμοσύνη, a 
synonym for πολυπραγμοσύνη, the very opposite of Platonic justice: see EHRENBERG 1947 p. 58, n. 
35. As a result, he is facing the reprobation of women and house-slaves: «those who do their own work 
[τοὺς μὲν τὰ αὑτῶν πράττοντας] in the city are called fools and held to be of little account, while 
those who do not are honoured and praised» (550a2-4). The two reproaches of Thrasymachus and of 
the bitter wife meet in that being just - either according to the Platonic concept, still embodied by the 
aristocratic man, or in the common view indicted by Thrasymachus - causes failure in public and private 
life. 
11 See for instance the endoxa about friendship in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1, 1155a10 
and IX 9, 1169b9: a friend is the greatest of the external goods. 
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the same holds for the persons since everyone is longing for the company of the wise 
person, expecting some benefit (210c7). Contrasted with this little protreptical discus-
sion qualifying wisdom as the capacity for appropriation, Thrasymachus’ argument 
leads to the conclusion that justice has nothing in common with the wisdom sketched 
out above and proves to be anything but a capacity. Instead of making anybody and 
anything appropriate (οἰκεῖον) to its bearer, it ends up in alienation in the proper 
sense of the term: just persons work for unjust men and serve them as their slaves. This 
contrasts once again with knowledge that bestows on its possessor unlimited freedom 
for any undertaking (Lysis, 210b4). It is injustice, according to Thrasymachus, that 
makes one «stronger, freer and more masterful» (344c4-6).  
This apparently irreducible gap between what is just and what is one’s own gives 
the impulse to the one-night inquiry in which Socrates has to show that being just can 
be at one’s advantage and can promote one’s happiness. The reconciliation between 
οἰκεῖον and justice, which occurs in Book IV with the characterization of justice as 
οἰκειοπραγία, is the agenda of the following books. It requires us beforehand to sin-
gle out what is genuinely οἰκεῖον, i.e. to clarify what the οἰκεῖον actually means. 
 
2. Οἰκεῖον and virtue in the function argument (Book I) 
Before turning to Book IV, let us consider the last significant mention of οἰκεῖον 
in Book I. It occurs in the last piece of Thrasymachus’ refutation by Socrates, the 
ἔργον/function argument. This argument has raised a great deal of discussion and 
suspicion among scholars but my point here is not to assess its relevance or coherence, 
but rather to call attention to the occurrences of οἰκεῖον within it. It takes justice to be 
a virtue and by doing so, it marks the first step towards an internalization of the con-
cept of justice, which makes it not only the notion describing the rules that regulate 
the social interactions and interpersonal exchanges, but a property belonging to the 
soul12. In order to show that justice, as the virtue of the soul, will make its possessor 
happy, Socrates’ strategy consists in defining virtue through the notion of ἔργον. The 
latter is characterized as follows: to any being, a proper function (ἔργον) is attached, 
and this function qualifies him as the only or the most capable of performing this 
given activity. The correct performance of this task is what we call virtue or excellence 
(ἀρετή) and this account holds for any given being, including the soul. From the fact 
that the soul is endowed with a function - which, among other things, consists in living 
(something no other can accomplish) - follows that its related virtue or excellence must 
consist in living well. Socrates is then in a position to claim that justice, as the virtue 
                                                          
12 HAVELOCK 1978 points out this progressive change of reference, from the social meaning of justice 
as the rule of reciprocity, which is still governing Cephalus’ speech, to a moral quality that «can be 
possessed independently of one’s relationship to another» (p. 311). 
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of the soul - what Thrasymachus was finally forced to grant at 348c-350d13 - is what 
makes us live well, i.e. be happy. 
Now, if we turn to the meaning of οἰκεῖον in the function argument, we notice 
that each of the three occurrences of the adjective οἰκεῖον at 353c1, 353c6, and 
353e214 modifies the substantive ἀρετή. This modification does require an explana-
tion. For what does it add to the notion of virtue that the latter does not already con-
tain? If the virtue of any given being consists in the correct performance of his ἔργον, 
and if the latter is nothing other than that for which he is the only one or the best 
qualified - in other words, his own function - speaking of οἰκεία ἀρετή sounds slightly 
redundant. What would be a virtue that would not be proper to its bearer?  
One could simply take it that οἰκεῖον works here as a substitute for the possessive 
and does not convey any peculiar meaning. But even if it were the case, this does not 
entirely account for the redundancy15. This may rather intend to call attention to the 
fact that virtue does belong to and benefit its «practitioner». The emphasis makes 
sense if we keep in mind the target of the argument, namely Thrasymachus who made 
a case for the opposite view that the virtue of justice is alien to its possessor. Further-
more, adding οἰκεῖον to the notion of ἀρετή makes it clear that the concept of virtue 
or excellence does not only apply to human or even living beings but that it extends 
to any possible being as soon as the latter is endowed with a function: an eye, a horse, 
etc.16 This prepares the ground for the idea that the soul as such has a virtue, which is 
a much more specific claim than the ordinary assertion that, for instance, human be-
ings have virtue. This specific claim calls for a determination of such an excellence - 
a task that will not be achieved until the end of Book IV where the composite nature 
of the soul is elucidated. By introducing the notion of οἰκεῖον, Socrates strengthens 
the intrinsic correlation between one’s ἔργον and one’s specific ἀρετή. Each of the 
                                                          
13 Justice is also qualified as the «human virtue» without further discussion by Polemarchus at 335c4. 
14 353b14-c1 «Could eyes perform their function [τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον] well if they lacked their proper 
virtue [τὴν αὑτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν]?» 
353c6-7 «I am not now asking about that, but about whether it is by means of their own proper 
virtue [τῇ οἰκείᾳ μὲν ἀρετῇ] that their function [τὸ αὑτῶν ἔργον] performs the things it performs well, 
and by means of the vice badly». 
353e1-2 «Will a soul perform its function [τὰ αὑτῆς ἔργα] well, Thrasymachus, if it is deprived of 
its own virtue [τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς], or is that impossible?» 
15 See e.g. 353c1 where both the adjective and the genitive of possession are present: μὴ ἔχοντα τὴν 
αὑτῶν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν («if they lacked their proper virtue»). Later, in the definition of justice as ἡ τοῦ 
οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις (434a1), «having and doing of one’s own and what belongs to 
one», the οἰκεῖον and the genitive also appear as non-redundant.  
16 The universal extension of the concept is made explicit in a reminder of the ἀρετή definition in 
Book X, 601d4-6: «Then aren’t the virtue, goodness, and correctness of each manufactured item, living 
creature, and activity related to nothing but the use for which each is made or naturally developed?» 
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three occurrences connects the proper excellence (οἰκεία ἀρετή) with the perfor-
mance of the related function (ἔργον). An excellence is the correlative of a function, 
enables and expresses its fullest display. This argument results in significantly building 
the notion of virtue into the very nature of its «bearer» or possessor. For the virtue 
proper to any given being is related to the activity that makes it different from any-
thing else. Indeed, everything else would be unable to perform the same activity (as) 
satisfactorily.  
A virtue, according to this philosophical and promising definition17, belongs to a 
given being because it exhibits the best achievement of the very activity that defines 
it. Therefore, speaking of οἰκεία ἀρετή points to the fact that virtue has to do with 
the genuine essence of the being in question and is specified by its very nature. The 
ἔργον argument conveys the idea that for each human being virtue ought to be found 
in what he is genuinely. In so doing, it anticipates a view that the following books are 
about to provide with some more concrete content by introducing the class division 
according to natural abilities. The very end of the Republic will also echo this con-
nection between virtue and nature, in a passage that shares with the present one a 
relatively abstract and ontological character. The proof of the immortality of the soul 
(608d-611d) will indeed rely upon what an οἰκεῖον κακόν means for any given being. 
This evil is also qualified as σύμφυτον (609a3), that is, grounded in the very nature 
of the being in question.  Socrates takes it that the proper evil is the one, if any, that is 
able to corrupt and to ruin the being it belongs to (609a8-b2). The challenge of the 
proof is then to find an item that cannot be destroyed by its proper evil, so as to make 
sure that it can resist any other corruption (609b4-6). Socrates turns then to the spe-
cific case of the soul and examines the effect on it of its proper evil, injustice: this 
obviously does not cause the destruction of its bearer for nobody dies, at least directly, 
from being unjust. He draws then the conclusion that the soul, whose proper evil is 
not likely to destroy it, cannot be ruined by anything else either and is then immortal. 
Similarly to the ἔργον argument, this ultimate proof relies upon the connection be-
tween the οἰκεῖον and the nature of the related being. 
At the end of Thraysmachus’ refutation, the link between οἰκεῖον and justice has 
been established through the broader notion of virtue, but it remains too superficial 
and tenuous to be really suitable. The function argument relies on a general concept 
of ἀρετή that could apply to any other excellence, e.g. wisdom, temperance, courage, 
all of them being equally qualified to be virtues of the soul. It is therefore too loose to 
                                                          
17 The ergon argument and its link to virtue will be famously taken up by Aristotle in Nicomachean 
Ethics I 7; in II 6, 1106a15-22 he gives the same account of virtue as the passage of the Republic, with 
the very same examples (eyes, horse). 
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meet Thrasymachus’ specific challenge focused on justice and its alleged value. Soc-
rates has to show what entitles him to assimilate justice and virtue, instead of taking it 
for granted18. The ultimate account of justice in Book IV will articulate it as the virtue 
of the whole that encompasses and presupposes the others and will achieve such a 
result. However summary it may be, this very last argument of Book I is nonetheless 
decisive: it brings out the conceptual connection between the notions of οἰκεῖον, 
ἀρετή and ἔργον - a connection that turns out to be crucial for the rest of the work19. 
Indeed, what comes next draws upon this first step, unfolding the political and psy-
chological implications of the ontological connection between these concepts. In Book 
II, the account of ἔργον will receive further elaboration with the introduction of the 
principle of specialization within the city. The basis of the social organization relies 
implicitly upon what an ἔργον is, namely the work or activity that can be best or only 
achieved by someone or something.  
The next steps will fill in this account by grounding the assigned function in one’s 
distinctive natural abilities revealed by the selective education process. Finding one’s 
function and keeping to it ultimately amounts to finding out what kind of person one 
is, one’s place within the three classes. One’s ἔργον, as what is most suitable for the 
individual and for his community, has to do with the achievement of the potentialities 
of one’s nature. 
 
3. Οἰκεῖον and οἰκειοπραγία (Book IV) 
Now it’s time to proceed to the main occurrence of «one’s own», namely that con-
cerning the very definition of justice through the idea of οἰκειοπραγία20. After 
                                                          
18 See the proverb of Theognis quoted by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics V, 1129b29: «in justice 
every excellence is comprehended» and the concluding lines of Nicomachean Ethics V 1, 1130a8-14. 
Nonetheless, according to ADKINS 1960, pp. 78-79, that doesn’t mean that the equation between justice 
and virtue belonged to common sense morality. 
19 As rightly pointed out by SANTAS 2001 the «functional theory of the good» sketched in Book I is 
then used in the following books. 
20 Socrates presents right from the start οἰκειοπραγία/τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν as the definition of 
(social) justice: the first occurrences (434c8-10, 435b4-5) take it as the definiens for the justice of the 
polis, further recalled at 441d8-10. The social account is then articulated with the characterization of 
psychological justice at 441d12-e2: «we should also bear in mind, then, that in the case of each of one of 
us as well, the one in whom each of the elements does its own will be just and do his own [ἕκαστος͵ ὅτου 
ἂν τὰ αὑτοῦ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττῃ͵ οὗτος δίκαιός τε ἔσται καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττων]». 
The various phrases expressing the «doing one’s own» principle (the instrumental dative at 441d9, the 
verb (δικαίαν) παρέχειν at 434c10, the words αἴτιον ὅτι at 443b1), leave little doubt that this principle 
is the cause, or the necessary condition (435b4-5) for calling the being in question «just». Justice could 
then easily be paraphrased as the disposition or the state in which each of the constitutive elements does 
its own, these elements being those of the city or of the soul. Until the very final description of justice in 
the soul (443d1-3), Socrates sticks to the «doing one’s own» formula. Let us notice, additionally, that 
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quickly contextualizing this definition, I will turn to its meaning and implications in 
order to determine how it meets the challenge of the Republic and to find out what 
the specific dimension of the οἰκεῖον is meant to bring in.  
Having completed the construction of the just city, Socrates proceeds to locate the 
last virtue still missing: justice. Since every single class in the city has been provided 
with its specific excellence - wisdom to the rulers, courage to the guardians, with the 
little exception that temperance (σωφροσύνη), the excellence of the producers, is also 
shared by the two other classes -, there is apparently no room left for a further virtue. 
Here comes Socrates’ coup de théâtre: since every part is already endowed with an 
excellence, the only way to make sense of the presence of justice within the good city 
(427e8, 434e2) is to assume that it belongs to the whole: that’s why Socrates and his 
companions were unable to locate it. As a definition, Socrates suggests that of τὰ 
αὑτοῦ πράττειν at 433a8, but not without noticing, first, that this definition has 
been at hand’s reach from the beginning, i.e. from the very first step of the construc-
tion of the primary city, and secondly, that they have heard about it many times. 
 
«What we laid down at the beginning when we were founding our city, as a general require-
ment - that, I think, or some form of that, is justice. And surely what we laid down and often 
repeated, if you remember, is that each person must perform one of the functions in the city, the 
one for which his nature was best adapted.  
- Yes, we did say that.  
- Moreover, we have heard many people say, and have often said ourselves, that justice is 
doing one’s own21 and not meddling with what is not one’s own [τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ 
πολυπραγμονεῖν].  
- Yes, we have.  
- This, then, my friend, provided it is taken in a certain way [τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον], 
would seem to be justice - this doing one’s own [τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν]» (433a1-b4). 
 
Each of these remarks deserves attention, as it should be whenever Socrates pro-
ceeds to a kind of mise-en-scene of his claims. Why does he argue that they have al-
ready told and been told about this account many times? It will not be the only time 
in the Republic that Socrates alludes to something supposedly already said or heard. 
Another - and famous - instance of some mysterious allusion is to be found in Book 
                                                          
Plotinus takes it to be the Platonic definition of justice on the basis of the Republic. Cf. Ennead. I 2 [19], 
6-7 where he endeavours to make sense of the definitions of the virtues when applied to the Principle. 
He struggles especially with justice as oikeiopragia since this notion presupposes parts, of which the 
Principle is deprived. See Ennead. I 2, 6, 20 Δικαιοσύνη δὲ εἴπερ οἰκειοπραγία, which sounds like a 
clear reminder of Rep. IV 434c. 
21 Following VLASTOS 1973, p. 115, in keeping the literal and formulaic translation of τὰ αὑτοῦ 
πράττειν without supplying any explanatory word like «work» or «task». 
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VI about the knowledge of the Good that Socrates enigmatically claims to have dis-
cussed many times (504e8, 505a3). In two key passages of the dialogue, therefore, 
Socrates uses a similar trick, prompting to pay attention to the forthcoming develop-
ment.  
Some commentators tend to deny without further ado any possible reference to 
the Republic or to any other of Plato’s works22. But should the possibility of a back or 
external reference be dismissed so quickly? The cryptic allusion of Book IV does hint 
at something actually said in the Republic, in Book II (370a4), when the generative 
principle of the primary city, the principle of specialization, i.e. limitation to one func-
tion, is introduced for the very first time23. Furthermore, the phrases introducing this 
catchphrase in Book II and IV remarkably echo one another. The initial question at 
371e9-10 - «Then, where [Ποῦ οὖν ἄν ποτε] are justice and injustice to be found in 
it?» - parallels narrowly the answer at 427d2-4 - «Look yourself [...], to see where 
[ποῦ ποτ΄ ἂν εἴη] justice and injustice might be in it». Both put forward the - slightly 
unexpected - question of the location of justice. This ποῦ question is especially note-
worthy for one would rather expect the more familiar τί question about justice, as it 
was the case at the end of Book I24. Nonetheless, the problem is the following: «the 
principle of specialization is in full and easy view. It has been before us a long while. 
The difficulty is to see that it is justice»25. 
Socrates furthermore claims that many others had also given this definition - 
which is even more puzzling. Once again, it seems difficult to deny from the outset 
any possible reference to other works, since other instances of the same phrase are to 
                                                          
22 See, among others, CORNFORD 1945, p. 124 and HAVELOCK 1978, p. 320. 
23 Admittedly the very first literal mention of the τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν describes the mistaken under-
standing of «doing one’s own», where everyone devotes himself exclusively to satisfying his needs without 
sharing any abilities or belongings with his fellow citizens. And the slightly mocking portrayal of the 
person torn between various activities, and running from one to another at 369e6-370a4, may remind 
the section of the Charmides where σωφροσύνη, understood as τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, is discussed and 
dismissed by Socrates (161e10-162a2). The insistence on the αὑτός at 370a4 (αὐτὸν δι’ αὑτὸν τὰ 
αὑτοῦ πράττει) also recalls the ironic introduction of Hippias in the Second Hippias when Socrates 
makes fun of the alleged πολυμαθία of the sophist with the portrayal of his entirely self-made costume 
(368b-e) and the review of his other pretended skills. On this point, see DONOVAN 2003. But this self-
centered interpretation of the principle is soon opposed to the contribution of everyone’s own work to 
the common use (369e2), which will turn out to be the correct understanding of the « doing one’s own », 
holding for the remainder of Books II and III (see II 374b9-c1; III 394e3-4; III 397e1-2; III 400e6; III 
406e2). According to HELMER 2010, p. 255, the τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν moves thus from an anti-political 
to a political meaning. 
24 See 354b4: «what justice is» [τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι ποτ΄ ἐστίν]. 
25 As summed up by BURNYEAT 2013, p. 214 
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be found in Plato26. The τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν famously occurs in the Charmides as 
an attempt to define σωφροσύνη (161b); it is also presented as a proverbial account 
of this virtue in the Timaeus (72a)27. But these two occurrences apply to σωφροσύνη 
and not to justice. Admittedly the formula τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν is commonly associ-
ated with σωφροσύνη and, in Plato’s time, marked by the political contest between 
oligarchic and democratic factions, both are claimed to be distinctive of conservative 
aristocratic values28. Although it is true that σωφροσύνη shares some features with 
justice, so that both virtues seem closely connected29, once again Socrates’ claim turns 
out to be equivocal at the very least, for the phrase τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν does not seem 
commonly supposed to be the account of justice30. 
Some interpreters also suggest convincingly that the commonplace formula for 
justice that Socrates has actually in mind is τὰ αὑτοῦ ἔχειν31. This wording, close to 
his own one, constitutes indeed the traditional concept of justice based on property32. 
Socrates would then proceed to an unnoticed expansion from the traditional sense 
(having one’s own, i.e. possessing) to a new definition (doing one’s own, i.e. acting)33 
- and that would explain why Socrates’ interlocutors are supposedly acquainted with 
this account. Besides, the «negative» characterization of justice as μὴ πολυπραγ-
μονεῖν - «not meddling», not «behaving as a busybody» - sounds familiar to a Greek 
audience. Indeed, πολυπραγμοσύνη is conveyed with negative value at Plato’s time: 
it is the political equivalent of the contiguous, but less politically committed, ὕβρις or 
πλεονεξία34. Resorting to πολυπραγμοσύνη to characterize injustice is then either 
                                                          
26 Besides the many occurrences in the Republic, the phrase appears in the Apology (33a) and in the 
Gorgias (526c), those two passages describing the philosophical life. 
27 «As the ancient proverb well puts it, ‘Only a man of sound mind [σώφρονι] may know himself 
and conduct his own affairs [τὸ πράττειν καὶ γνῶναι τά τε αὑτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτὸν]’», transl. Zeyl in 
COOPER 1997. 
28 See e.g. GUTHRIE 1975, pp. 166-167, SCHMID 1998, pp. 4-5, NORTH 1966, pp. 111-112. I am 
thankful to the anonymous referee for bringing this political context to my attention. 
29 Several clues point to their mutual overlap. Both are virtues applying to the whole city (see 432a1-
4 for temperance, 433d1-5 for justice); both are defined in terms of harmony (see 430e4, 431e8 for 
temperance, 443d5, 443e2 for justice). ROWE 1979 addresses the issue of the unclear distinction, if there 
is any, between the two virtues in the Republic.  
30 In Alcibiades (127b f.), the authenticity of which is controversial, the formula occurs within an 
investigation concerning friendship, justice, and also related to σωφροσύνη: see HELMER 2010, pp. 251-
253. But it does not refer to commonly shared views. 
31 See GUTGLUECK 1988 and SCHÜTRUMPF 1996. 
32 See SCHÜTRUMPF 1996, pp. 51-54. 
33 According to GUTGLUECK 1988, p. 37. 
34 See EHRENBERG 1947 with abundant literary evidence for the political meaning of πολυπραγ-
μοσύνη, and also ADKINS 1976, pp. 325-327. For πλεονεξία as the usual or expected term to designate 
injustice, see Thrasymachus’ speech where the unjust man is portrayed as the one able to πλεονεκτεῖν 
on a large scale (344a1), and Aristotle who turns to πλεονεξία as the contrary of justice for delimiting 
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meant to stress the political dimension of this other contrary of justice, or it is intended 
to draw on its linguistic root referring to action, as we shall see a bit later. In any case 
there are some reasons for not ignoring Socrates’ claim that this account has already 
been heard.  
Nonetheless, the motto of «doing one’s own» is submitted to a wide-ranging re-
definition, as indicated by the qualification at 433b3: τρόπον τινὰ γιγνόμενον. To 
what extent does this Platonic understanding modify the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν? The latter may be of common use, but the substantive 
coined from it, οἰκειοπραγία, is Plato’s invention35, and this neologism hints at the 
significant amendment that the former catchphrase will undergo. Given the organiz-
ing principles of the ideal political community that have been laid down, it is now 
clear that the οἰκεῖον in question is not just a contingent matter, but has to be found 
in the function for which one is devised by nature. As the construction of the first city 
in Book II demonstrated, doing one’s own does not amount to minding one’s own 
business in some self-centered way but rather to accomplishing the task corresponding 
to one’s capacities. Nature (φύσις) is indeed the basis for the ascription of the right 
function to each person or class in the city, as Socrates emphatically recalls it at 
433a636. This natural basis has been supplemented and strengthened at the end of 
Book III with the «noble lie» of autochthony and the tale of three races (414b-415d).   
Without putting too much weight on the term οἰκειοπραγία, let us notice that 
this abstract neologism, which occurs only once at 434c8, taken in a strictly literal 
sense, narrowly matches the account of ἔργον launched in Book I. Performing one’s 
ἔργον - which could be literally reframed as οἰκειοπράττειν (should the word exist) 
- would not be possible without the proper virtue (see 353b14-c2, c6-7, quoted ear-
lier). As mentioned earlier, the introduction of the ἔργον resulted in yoking the notion 
of virtue and that of the nature of the subject together. If this view is correct, the de-
scription of justice as οἰκειοπραγία might thus meaningfully fill the gaps left in the 
end of Book I, by vindicating what Socrates’ refutation of Thrasymachus had simply 
taken for granted, namely the status of justice as overall virtue. This feature can now 
be understood on a deeper level. The full demonstration that justice is indeed the vir-
tue of the whole soul and then a synonym for virtue in general requires securing the 
                                                          
the scope of particular justice contrasted with other virtues in NE V 2 (1129a32, b1, b7, b9, b10): 
πλεονεξία is the vice corresponding to the kind of unjust acts that cannot be referred to any other vicious 
motive like intemperance or cowardice (1130a16-32). 
35 According to the TLG, no occurrence prior to that of the Republic is attested. Another, and quite 
parallel, expression, ἰδιοπραγία, is coined by Plato in the Laws IX 875b7: see LAKS 2013, pp. 185-187. 
36 433a6: «the one <function> for which his nature was best adapted [εἰς ὃ αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις 
ἐπιτηδειοτάτη πεφυκυῖα εἴη]». 
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isomorphic structure of the city and the soul: the first political definition, the eidolon37 
of justice illustrated by the «one man, one job» principle, has to be extended to the 
soul that turns out to be tripartite38. The isomorphism between city and soul is crucial 
for the characterization of justice as οἰκειοπραγία to be valid. If this does make sense 
for a being made of parts, as it is the case with the city, in which the «doing one’s 
own» principle allows its constitutive elements to cohere and prevents the com-
pounded from falling apart, it seems to be more challenging to stick to it on the scale 
of a being that is already seemingly one, i.e. the human being. Having proved that the 
soul is endowed with parts each of which is devoted to a specific function or activity, 
Socrates will then be entitled to apply to the soul his previous accounts of the virtues, 
including that of justice. 
In the compound οἰκειοπραγία, both elements are important and concur to single 
out justice. One important feature lies in the focus on agency, the capacity of action. 
The focus on action is sensible, in the supposedly traditional conception of τὰ αὑτοῦ 
πράττειν as well as in its abstract rephrasing as οἰκειοπραγία. This account is first 
supported by the exemplifications of justice in the various actions that common mo-
rality would not allow any just person to perform (stealing, temple-robbing, betray-
ing, breaking one’s word, committing adultery, neglecting one’s familial and religious 
duties...) at 442e-443b5: all these actions can be interpreted as doing one’s own in the 
sense of keeping hands off what belongs to others and of accomplishing one’s duties39. 
But beyond the level of these external instantiations of justice, one ought to under-
stand that οἰκειοπραγία cannot be restricted to external behavior and has a deeper 
meaning at the level of the soul itself. Therefore, the task is now to make good sense 
of the notion of οἰκειοπραγία and of the focus on action when it comes to the soul. 
That’s why Socrates stipulates that justice lies in a person’s inner activity (443c9 ff.):  
                                                          
37 The εἴδωλόν τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης at 443c4-5, parallel to the τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης of the 
previous lines (443c1), echoes the τι εἶδος at 433a3, at the very beginning of the section devoted to 
justice. εἴδωλον, I take it, does not necessarily have the negative sense of a phantom here, but might 
rather be understood as an image, i.e. a concrete representation of some abstract or invisible entity (see 
Theaetetus 208c5, Politicus 286a1). Contrary to ADAM 1963, I, p. 262 note ad 443Bff., I don’t take the 
civic or politic justice to be, as a shadow or a copy, less valuable than psychic justice. The isomorphic 
relationship between soul and city does not imply any hierarchy between them, only a variation of scale 
(see 435a5-b2). See also BURNYEAT 2013, p. 230, «individual justice and social justice are both cause 
and effect of each other».  
38  See 435a-441c. Within the limits of this paper, I cannot discuss the details of this crucial part of 
the argument that I shall only take for granted. Plato’s Greek does not always use the word «part» when 
referring to the several subjects of various and possibly conflicting impulses but he clearly opposes them 
to the «soul as a whole» at 436b2. The term μέρος is however used at 442b10, c5 when Socrates entrusts 
two of the parts of the soul with their own virtue.  See LORENZ 2005, p. 20. 
39 Though framed negatively, as abstaining from wrongdoing, rather than positively, these 
instantiations match common representations of just behavior: see COOPER 2004, p. 258. 
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«Justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it is not concerned with someone’s doing his 
own on the outside [οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ]. On the contrary, it is concerned with 
what is inside [περὶ τὴν ἐντός], with what is truly one’s own self and one’s very own [ὡς ἀληθῶς 
περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ]. It means that he does not allow the elements in him each to do the 
job of some other [μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ], or the three sorts of 
elements in his soul to meddle with one another [μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν 
τῇ ψυχῇ γένη]».  
 
This insistence aims at strengthening the isomorphism with the city40. In a city, 
οἰκειοπραγία means for each of its parts to do its job, what is responsible for the 
harmony of the whole. For an individual, it cannot be simply understood as sticking 
to his social function and accomplishing his social duties. Otherwise the parallel would 
not hold. The very same plurality is to be found within the single soul, each of which 
constitutive parts restricts itself to its functions and objects, and does not try to over-
step them. Justice is nothing other than some inward activity by which each compo-
nent of one’s being sticks to its assigned task. 
This focus on action may thereby help distinguishing justice from temperance. 
While temperance in Republic IV is defined in terms of true belief41, as an assent to 
the right order and hierarchy between what ought to rule and what ought to be ruled 
(433c6-8), the characterization of justice in terms of οἰκειοπραγία seems to point 
straightforwardly to action. This focus on action may also explain why Socrates chose 
to qualify the contrary of justice as πολυπραγμοσύνη rather than using the usual 
πλεονεξία. Besides the abovementioned obvious political connotation of the former, 
the wording itself refers to action, so that the term marks out the very antithesis of 
οἰκειοπραγία. In πολυπραγμονεῖν «the verbal component, - πραγμονεῖν - func-
tions essentially as a frequentative of πράττειν from which it is ultimately derived»42.   
This focus on action was already underlying the first book. It is implied by the very 
first discussion with Polemarchus, where Socrates wonders «in what action (πρᾶξις) 
or with respect to what work (ἔργον), then, is the just man the one most able to help 
friends and harm enemies» (332e3-4). The definition of justice now achieved may 
account for the fact that Polemarchus was unable to suggest any specific action for 
which the possession of justice would be specifically responsible and beneficial. In-
deed, it turns out that justice does not consist in any specific external action, as we 
have just seen, but in a certain and general way of acting by governing each of our 
                                                          
40 A detailed account of the parallel procedures for defining justice within the frame of the city-soul 
analogy is given by BURNYEAT 2013. 
41 The definition of courage likewise entails a cognitive element, as true belief about what is to be 
feared or not, while wisdom, unsurprisingly, is expressed in terms of knowledge (see 428b6 ff.). 
42 As pointed out by GUTGLUECK 1988, p. 36. 
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actions insofar as it rules over our whole soul.  More importantly, the argument of the 
«gang of thieves» in Book I has already suggested that the effect of justice is to make 
an action possible. Socrates had indeed pushed Thrasymachus to admit that injustice, 
implying disorder and revolt within any whole constituted by several elements, would 
finally make this whole unable to act, because this lack of agreement and cooperation 
results in internal chaos (351d-352a). In Book IV 444b Socrates significantly uses the 
same language as in Book I, the lexical field of στάσις43, to describe the effects of 
injustice in the soul. In the discussion with Thrasymachus, the argument was then 
extended without further justification to the individual, whose compounded nature 
remained anything but warranted at that point of the dialogue (351e6). The analysis 
of the soul provided in Book IV enables us to give account of this argument and to 
make full sense of the view that injustice makes one incapable of genuine action, pow-
erless rather than powerful44. Even the individual proves to be complex, rather than 
simple: his soul turns out to involve three parts whose harmony is obtained over and 
against dispersal and disagreement. 
If I am right in pinpointing this focus on action attendant to the definition of jus-
tice45, this idea might have further connection with the structure and the aim of the 
whole argument of the Republic. Let us recall that Socrates has to take up the chal-
lenge that consists in showing that a just life is a happy one (352d1-6). Let us also bear 
in mind the literal meaning of εὖ πράττειν. If εὖ πράττειν means doing or acting 
well, and if justice, as the virtue of the whole soul, consists specifically in acting, then, 
it is easy to conclude that the just person is the one who is doing well, who εὖ πράττει, 
in other words, according to the colloquial sense of εὖ πράττειν, who is happy. This 
is of course not the end of the argument, which will go on until the end of Book IX, 
but it may be a subtle introduction of it.  If one bears in mind the very end of Book I 
and its quite abrupt ending of the discussion, Book IV seems to provide a much more 
elaborated and fleshed out account of what εὖ πράττειν means and of how justice 
and happiness could be closely interwoven within it. 
 
«Equally, the perfect performance of its function is evidently the eu prattein, the ‘faring well’, 
the eudaimonia of each element, for this performance give complete satisfaction with no regrets. 
Dikaiosynē is the condition in which each of the elements is performing its function perfectly, is 
displaying its aretē, excellence, is agathos, a good specimen of its kind, eu prattei, is in a state of 
                                                          
43 The vocabulary at 444b1, 444b3 echoes narrowly that of 351d3, e2, 352a2, a6. Later on, at 
470b4-9, στάσις is literally articulated as «hate towards one’s own» (ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῇ τοῦ οἰκείου ἔχθρᾳ) 
unlike πόλεμος, which concerns what is alien (ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου). 
44 A further hint that Book IV meets the initial challenges of Book I is that the conclusion reached at 
IV 443e4-444a2, showing that justice is a goodness implying wisdom [σοφίαν], a injustice a vice involv-
ing ignorance [ἀμαθίαν], takes over the very terms of Socrates’ interrogation at I 354b6. 
45 See also GUTGLUECK 1988, p. 37-39, for further evidence. 
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eudaimonia. Thus dikaiosynē is an aretē and an essential condition of eudaimonia; which is what 
Plato set out to prove»46.   
  
To meet Thrasymachus’ challenge, Socrates’ account of justice ultimately has to 
show that the action performed by a just soul actually benefits the agent and his own 
interests instead of alienating him. Here is the point marked out by the οἰκεῖον in the 
οἰκειοπραγία. The self and his interests are everything but forgotten by Socrates. Just 
after specifying that justice has to do with inward, rather than outward action, he 
points out that it deals with «what is truly himself and his own» (ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ 
ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ 443d1), and «regulates well what is really his own» (τῷ ὄντι 
τὰ οἰκεῖα εὖ θέμενον 443d3-4). The focus on the self is rather striking in this account 
of justice but these modifying qualifications make it clear that the self and his own are 
very different from the ordinary meaning of the terms from which we started in Book 
I. The former is nothing but the soul, far away from that social self, longing for power, 
honors and the social considerations that a cunning injustice was supposed to provide 
us with. The latter is nothing but the best capacities of the soul, expressing its very 
nature, far away from any material goods, family and property that unjust acts were 
supposed to secure. This is all the more obvious since at least two of the three classes 
in question, the guardians and the rulers, have no property (cf. 416c). What τὰ οἰκεῖα 
means, thus, cannot refer to any kind of possession anymore. Finding and arranging 
what is really his own, namely the parts of his soul47, enables the individual to become 
one and oneself, from the many he used to be (443e1-2). Lines 443d-e do not only 
intend to parallel the effect of justice at the political level of a community that is by 
nature made of several and separate elements. They also deliver some truth about 
what it takes for a person to become one, to unify him- or herself. In this process, to 
locate what is one’s own is essential, given that this «own» cannot consist any longer 
in belongings or material items. That justice promotes the genuine self and one’s own 
has become clear provided this wide-ranging transformation of our preconceptions. 
The description of injustice might support this view: facing Adeimantus’ objection 
that the way of life he assigned to the guardians is likely to make unhappy the very 
best men, those arguably the most entitled to satisfy their desires, Socrates replies by 
depicting a situation matching narrowly what is going to be designated as 
πολυπραγμοσύνη. He concludes that complying with such inappropriate desires 
would «make them something other than guardians» (420d). That is what would 
                                                          
46 As ADKINS 1960, p. 286 insightfully comments. 
47 That the soul, especially the intellect, is one’s own more than anything else is formulated in an 
incidental remark pointing out that for the souls, the pain resulting from the intellectual effort, compared 
with that of physical effort, is «more their own [οἰκειότερος], being peculiar to them and not shared with 
the body» (535b6-9). See also Laws V 726a2 ff., commented by LAKS 2013, pp. 186-187: «Of all the 
things a man can call his own [οἰκειότατον ὄν], the holiest (though the gods are holier still) is his soul» 
(transl. Saunders in COOPER 1997). 
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happen if they let one part of themselves, in this case the appetitive part, take control 
over themselves, if they err about what is their own, forgetting that it does not lie in 
belongings, but rather ultimately in an activity. For doing one’s own consists in doing 
what one should do, given what one’s nature is. The function to perform, provided it 
is appropriate to one’s nature, expresses what one is. This injustice internal to their 
soul, preventing performance of their function within the city, would then affect what 
they are. In other words, it would alter their nature, and such indulgence, once ex-
tended to the whole city, would result in the fact that «a farmer wouldn’t be a farmer, 
nor a potter a potter, nor would any of the others from which a city is constituted 
remain true to type» (421a). The inordinate growth of desires that are irrelevant to 
one’s function would turn upside down the internal structure of the city by preventing 
each part of it from doing its task, altering the very nature of each of these parts and 
thereby dooming the city. This imaginary scenario provides us with a description of 
what πολυπραγμοσύνη means and how it impacts the beings it affects. It alters their 
identity, what they are, since they are not able to do their own anymore.  
If this reading of the οἰκειοπραγία is sound, Socrates’ appeal to a traditional con-
ception of justice as τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν carries hence with it a substantial transfor-
mation. It is not just a matter of restricting oneself to one’s belongings or business 
without trying to take advantage of other people, i.e. of avoiding πλεονεξία. Rather, 
it seems that the two parts of the compound οἰκειοπραγία deserve attention and that 
their scope goes much further than expected at first sight. Justice is indeed the virtue 
that expresses itself in action. Because such an action is appropriate and peculiar to 
one’s nature, by doing one’s own, one becomes one and oneself.  Contrary to what 
Thrasymachus emphatically claimed, justice is not what severs us from our own. It 
rather consists in doing one’s own, in finding and realizing it. As a result, once the 
nature of this «own» has been understood, and once the tentative and sketch-like ar-
gument from the end of Book I has been supplemented with the developments of 
Book IV, one is fully in position to understand that justice, as achieving one’s own, 
definitely promotes one’s happiness.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper intended to give a quick sketch of the intensely discussed account of 
justice in the Republic through the peculiar focus on the οἰκεῖον. Using the notion as 
a guiding thread throughout the vast frame of the Republic elicits some Platonic con-
cerns, otherwise likely to be overlooked. First, it shows how Socrates’ account of justice 
meets point by point Thrasymachus’ challenge by attempting to fill the gap that the 
latter had diagnosed between the practice of justice and the pursuit of one’s own good. 
Then, it illuminates the progress of the discussion, by gradually elaborating the con-
cept of justice as a virtue, unfolding by the same token its connection to happiness. 
Following the tracks of the οἰκεῖον brings out how some tentative answers from Book 
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I come to completion and full sense through the later developments of Books II to IV. 
Ultimately, focusing on the role played by one’s own in the overall case for justice 
makes it clear how the human being can appropriate the good. Indeed, Platonic justice 
is the virtue of the whole - city or soul: it consists in one’s own activity and proves able 
to unify this whole through the very same activity. It is thus able to suggest how the 
good can belong to us. The good is not only to be found in a distant Form, possibly 
out of reach, as Aristotle’s criticism will not fail to point out in Nicomachean Ethics I 
6. It also consists in one’s activity, in the achievement of one’s nature. This is precisely 
what makes the good οἰκεῖον, proper or appropriate to us - a view that would not be 
that alien to Aristotle himself. Reading through the Republic from the perspective of 
one’s own, by paying attention to the way it intervenes and interacts with other ethical 
concepts of the work, makes it clear how Plato can face the concern about the distant 
character of his conception of the good and the attendant difficulty to relate it to what 
one would expect the human good to consist in. Once having located one’s own in 
one’s activity instead of confusing it with one’s belongings, each of us should be able 
to understand a bit more clearly how and why justice, as dealing with one’s own, will 
eventually make its possessor happy48. 
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